Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
Volume 2012 (2012), Article ID 482481, 18 pages
Evolution of Equity Norms in Small-World Networks
1Grupo INSISOC, Área de Organización de Empresas, Departamento de Ingeniería Civil, Escuela Politécnica Superior, Universidad de Burgos, Edificio La Milanera, C/Villadiego S/N, 09001 Burgos, Spain
2Grupo INSISOC, Departamento de Organización de Empresas y CIM, Escuela de Ingenierías Industriales, Universidad de Valladolid, Paseo del Cauce 59, 47011 Valladolid, Spain
Received 21 November 2011; Accepted 10 January 2012
Academic Editor: Zuo Nong Zhu
Copyright © 2012 José I. Santos et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
The topology of interactions has been proved very influential in the results of models based on learning and evolutionary game theory. This paper is aimed at investigating the effect of structures ranging from regular ring lattices to random networks, including small-world networks, in a model focused on property distribution norms. The model considers a fixed and finite population of agents who play the Nash bargaining game repeatedly. Our results show that regular networks promote the emergence of the equity norm, while less-structured networks make possible the appearance of fractious regimes. Additionally, our analysis reveals that the speed of adoption can also be affected by the network structure.